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This investigation into small-to-medium sized wine businesses empirically tests linkages among differentiation strategies and ﬁnancial
performance over time. Using a two-by-two model, we examine the impact of differentiation strategies on proﬁtability and growth. Financial and
operational data from a proprietary database of 71 United States wineries, encompassing ﬁve continuous years (2006–2010), provide longitudinal
robustness. Management decisions regarding resources and capabilities are used to cluster the sample ﬁrms into a two-by-two differentiation
strategy model. Those wineries sourcing over 50% estate grapes and distributing over 50% direct-to-consumer have higher gross margins
compared to other clusters. Direct-to-consumer distribution decisions impact growth. Results of this research indicate that distribution channel
choice-direct-to-consumer-positively impacts gross proﬁt margin and winery growth rates. Supply chain choice-sourcing estate grapes also
positively impacts gross proﬁt margin. This study uses reported ﬁnancial data that have not been made available to researchers.
& 2015 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Competition is everywhere! Managers are constantly mak-
ing decisions among strategic alternatives to produce a
competitive advantage in an attempt to earn above-average
returns. Yet ﬁrms operating in mature, traditional industries,
such as the wine industry, are unlikely to achieve a unique
advantage, based on resource capabilities and product quality
alone (Edelman et al., 2005; Gimeno-Gascon et al., 1997).
Mature and fragmented industries such as agriculture, retail,
and services are primarily comprised of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME). These industries possess speciﬁc
characteristics, such as low entry barriers (Porter, 1980), low
degrees of private or asymmetric information (Barney, 1991),
and low levels of resources with limited strategic substitut-
ability (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Economies of scale/10.1016/j.wep.2015.10.001
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a.edu (D. Jordan).may be challenging to achieve, preventing SMEs from low-
ering costs of production by spreading ﬁxed costs for capital
improvements (Hunger and Wheelen, 2011). SMEs in these
industries achieve superior performance not only because they
have accumulated more valued resources, but also because
they make better use of those resources under their control
(Barney, 1991).
‘Better use’ of resources support differentiation within an
industry and encompasses: (1) products or service innovation
(Banker et al., 2014; Brush and Chaganti, 1999; Brush et al.,
2001; Chandler and Hanks, 1994); (2) superior product
quality/customer service, e.g. quality control, satisfaction of
customer needs, highest product quality, and unmatched
service (Edelman et al., 2005; Porter, 1985); and (3) geogra-
phical and buyer segmentation (Carter et al., 1994; Miller,
1988). SMEs operating in mature, highly competitive environ-
ments may be unable to successfully differentiate due to low
barriers to entry, or may have insufﬁciently rare or easy-to-
imitate resources, limiting the range of viable strategic alter-
natives (Hammervoll et al., 2014; Sandberg and Hofer, 1987).lsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The United States wine industry is one example of a mature,
highly fragmented yet intensely competitive industry, encom-
passing 7762 U.S. bonded and virtual wineries in early 2014
(Wines and Vines staff, 2014). This total included bonded
wineries (those with production facilities and/or vineyards —
6565 wineries) and virtual wineries (i.e. those with neither
production facilities nor vineyards — 1197) Wine sales in the
United States, inclusive of imports from producers outside the
U.S., climbed to 375 million cases in 2014. This represented a
growth of 1% from 2013, reaching an estimated retail value of
$37.6 billion. Of the total cases sold in the U.S. in 2014,
California's 225 million cases sold captured a 60% share of the
total United States market (The Wine Institute, 2015). The
United States wine industry has been described as ‘purely
competitive’, that is, as there is no single domestic lowest-cost
provider, rivals are forced to compete via focused or mass
differentiation strategies (Swaminathan and Delacroix, 1991;
Porter, 1998), and often try to distinguish themselves through
quality or innovation (Duquesnois et al., 2010; Stenholm,
2011). Wine industry strategy has traditionally been
production-driven and focused on volume growth dictated by
the availability of grapes. However, production-driven strate-
gies in the wine industry do not guarantee long-term ﬁnancial
performance (Brown and Butler, 1995; Steinthal, 2004).
Wineries that create differentiation advantages are postulated
to become more resilient and proﬁtable (Steinthal, 2004;
Steinthal and Hinman, 2007).
A watershed event for the United States wine industry was the
2005 Granholm v. Heald decision that served to liberalize direct-
to-consumer (DTC) sales of wine across state lines, e.g. from
producer to consumer but absent a trade intermediary (wholesaler,
distributor, retailer).1 DTC sales of wines via websites, tasting
rooms, and wine clubs are strategies different from the traditional
routes to market via distributors and wholesalers. DTC is
expected to produce higher gross margins: wineries normally sell
products to distributors and wholesalers at 50% of the ﬁnal retail
price, yet are able to sell products DTC at the full retail price, less
any discounts provided to and taken by their wine club members.
The value of DTC shipments grew 15% to $1.8 billion in 2014,
while volume of DTC shipments in 9-l cases rose to 3.9 million
(Gordon, 2015). A strategy that incorporates DTC sales presents
both advantages and disadvantages: full mark-up, and positive
and ongoing customer relationships, but complicated marketing,
tracking, and shipping logistics (Gurau and Duquesnois, 2008).1In the 2005 Supreme Court's Granholm v. Heald decision, the Court held
that the 21st Amendment “did not give states the authority to pass non-uniform
laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods.” For a typical U.S.
winery, this meant that individual state regulations now dictated the fees and
taxes, as well as how much, how often, or if any of its products could be
shipped directly to a consumer of that state, thus bypassing the three-tier
system. In the aftermath of the Granholm v. Heald ruling, opportunities in the
direct-to-consumer (DTC) channel began to expand (due to the ruling from), as
the number of states that accepted DTC shipments continued to increase to 40
states in 2012, an increase of nine states over 2011.Strategies that create competitive advantages for wine
businesses are understudied (Delmas and Grant, 2008;
Fearne, 2009). Just prior to the prolonged recession that
negatively impacted all sectors in 2009 and 2010, the effect
of the Napa Valley wine industry alone on the U.S. economy
was $42.4 billion (Stonebridge Research, 2008). Therefore,
with that much money at stake, it is surprising that there have
been relatively few recent studies linking the drivers of
competitive advantage to performance in the wine industry
(Hammervoll et al., 2014; Taplin, 2006; Jordan et al., 2007).
One explanation for the scarcity of such prior studies is the fact
that proprietary data, from SMEs and other family-owned busi-
nesses that comprise the preponderance of the wine industry, have
heretofore been largely unavailable to researchers to determine to
what extent differentiation strategy theory and competitive advan-
tage, measured by ﬁnancial performance, are linked. Prior studies
have implied but not demonstrated that such a relationship exists,
despite the absence of longitudinal indicators of ﬁnancial perfor-
mance (Bernabeu et al., 2008; Melnyk et al., 2003; Orth et al.,
2007; Taplin, 2006).
1.2. Research questions
Although many recognize M.E. Porter's (1980) theory of
generic competitive strategy as the dominant paradigm in
strategy research and practice, some suggest that cost leader-
ship and differentiation (1) act as nothing more than high-level
discriminators of competitive strategy designs (Campbell-
Hunt, 2000), (2) contribute only tangentially to what has
become the challenge of achieving a temporary competitive
advantage (D’Aveni et al., 2010), (3) do not predict signiﬁcant
differences in performance in SMEs (Rubach et al., 2002), nor
(4) describe completely how SME strategy formulation and
implementation occur (Ebben and Johnson, 2005). According
to Walters et al. (2005), the competitive advantage of a ﬁrm
pursuing a differentiation strategy is often a result of manage-
ment decisions regarding the development of new products and
services, product design, product features, brand image, super-
ior service, technology, and distribution. A more recent study
conﬁrms that producers with a differentiation are able to
maintain a superior performance over those who pursue a cost
leadership strategy (Banker et al., 2014).
These observations lead to two research questions:
1. How do individual SMEs in a focal industry — wine —
differentiate amongst rivals? (This is particularly salient for
the wine industry, given that the product in the bottle is
essentially a commodity, albeit a ‘luxury’ commodity).
2. What, if any, are the impacts of various differentiation
strategies on ﬁnancial performance?
This paper is organized into ﬁve sections. Section 2 expands
on the literature and sets the stage for the hypotheses tested in
this study. Section 3 describes the research design and
statistical methodology. Section 4 presents the analysis of
data. We conclude with a discussion, inclusive of limitations of
this investigation, future research directions, and implications
2The ‘Big Five’ wine distributors in the United States included Southern
Wine & Spirits, Charmer, Republic/NDC, Glazer's, and Young's Market. These
ﬁve distributors owned an estimated 52% market share in 2008, a share that
had grown from about 39% since 2003, and their market share was forecasted
by Silicon Valley Bank to increase substantially over the course of the next
decade, as an increasing number of smaller or ‘boutique’ wine distributors
were expected to exit the industry via acquisition or liquidation or default.
3Négociant is a French term for someone who purchases wine or grapes for
the purposes of selling the end product (wine) under their own label. This can
be done by purchasing fruit, where the négociant has full control over the wine
produced; or by purchasing wine already produced by other vintners, aging this
wine, blending it and then selling it with their own label. A virtual winery is
S.K. Newton et al. / Wine Economics and Policy 4 (2015) 88–9790for SME practitioners regarding alternative differentiation
strategies to sustain a competitive advantage.
2. Relevant research orientations and hypotheses
Prior researchers suggest that, in order to achieve above-
average performance, SMEs in mature industries pursue cost
leadership via consolidation and development of economies of
scale (Miles et. al, 1993; Porter, 1985, 1998) or differentiation
via quality or innovation (Maruso and Weinzimmer, 1999;
McGee and Shook, 2000). Dess et al. (1997) found that
innovative differentiation was a positive predictor of ﬁrm
performance. Hsueh and Tu (2004) found that innovation was
positively related to both proﬁts and sales growth. A survey of
178 small business owners in Indiana indicated that they
appeared to be more likely to achieve a higher level of
ﬁnancial performance through product innovation in hostile
environments (Wright et al., 2005). Empirical analysis of 2003
data from Inc 500 fast-growth ﬁrms by Chang et al. (2011)
found that ﬁrms delivering similar products/services to existing
offerings in the market experienced lower sales growth rates
than those offering incremental and major innovations, but this
was a cross-sectional study of ﬁrms that already had superior
performance characteristics relative to other SMEs. Stenholm
(2011) also posited a positive relationship between SME
innovation and growth rates in sales. For SMEs, the most
important assets in combination or in toto are known as
distinctive competencies, that is, they offer the means to
differentiate in order to leverage growth and outperform rivals.
SMEs seek distinctive competencies to take advantage of
speciﬁc strengths and maximize return on investment. In this
vein, Duquesnois et al. (2010) found that only the very largest
French wine producers strove for cost leadership while the
majority, SME producers, pursued a niche or focused differ-
entiation strategy. A more recent study found similarity in
French wineries' growth of sales and net proﬁt even though
wineries used two different marketing strategies – niche
strategy and mass-market strategy (Hammervoll et al., 2014).
SMEs in the United States wine industry also develop
distinctive competencies in order to compete aggressively on
quality with rivals. These competencies include: (1) control over
quality via vertical integration i.e., in a winery supply chain, there
is a continuum from ‘virtual’ winery, one that outsources
everything including growing grapes, processing grapes via
fermentation, blending and aging wines, and bottling of wine,
all the way up to a fully integrated or estate winery, and
(2) extending reach to consumers, e.g. using direct sales via
tasting rooms, wine clubs, and websites in order to escape the
power of the three-tier distribution channel from producer to
wholesaler to retailer (Williamson and Zeng, 2009).
2.1. Differentiation via sourcing choice
Prior researchers have linked winery sourcing and supply-chain
logistics as a means to maintain control over transaction costs
(Fernandez-Olmosá et al., 2009). Wineries must continuously
evaluate performance of their supply chains, inasmuch as wine isa ‘global product’ and hence requires a variety of marketing
approaches (Orth et al., 2007). Holding winery location constant,
supply chain choices not only affect costs, but also a brand's
reputation and the propensity of consumers to pay a price
premium, e.g., for estate-only wines from fully integrated
producers (Goodhue, et al., 2003). Selection of supply chains
— grape growing and wine making and related support activities
— has been shown to impact competitive advantage in this
industry (Cholette and Venkat, 2009).
2.2. Differentiation via distribution choice
Whereas U.S. wineries have traditionally relied upon the
‘three-tier’ distribution system of wholesalers and distributors
to reach off-premise consumers (e.g. retailers) and on-premise
consumers (e.g. hotels and restaurants), that system attenuated
market penetration for SME wineries, particularly when
competing against higher volume, large-scale wineries. The
balance of power in the industry thus shifted to distributors due
to consolidation of the resale channel (Taplin, 2006).2 When
pitted in competition against the largest wine companies (such
as Gallo, Constellation, and Diageo), SMEs seek alternative
distribution channels to the extent that those are available and
permitted by law (Taplin, 2006). DTC sales allow greater
control over a winery's pricing strategy (Coppla, 2000). Gurau
and Duquesnois (2008) opined that, in order to increase sales
and production volumes, wineries need to adopt a variety of
direct distribution channels, particularly direct sales at the
winery via tasting rooms and wine clubs and/or via the
internet, that in turn serve to develop customer intimacy via
customer loyalty programs.
2.3. Model development
Different investments in ﬁrm resources and different strate-
gic choices regarding those markets in which to compete can
contribute to above-average ﬁrm performance (Leitner and
Güldenberg, 2010). An example of ﬁrm resource in the wine
industry is the classiﬁcation of wineries as estate, Négociant,
or virtual. Another ﬁrm resource example would be the
winery's grape sourcing decisions to produce its wine. Self-
identiﬁed estate wineries generally use grapes grown on the
estate as their source of supply, but also may purchase grapes
and have long-standing relationships with their suppliers.
Négociant and virtual wineries are classiﬁed as non-estate.3
Non-estate wineries source from purchased grapes or
Fig. 1. Two-by-two differentiation strategy model.
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vertical integration or supply chain choices that may provide
not only control over costs, but also increased branding and
marketing differentiation (Orth et al., 2007; Goodhue et al.,
2003). Firms use sourcing options as a means to build brand
equity (Thode and Maskulka, 1998). Marketing of ‘estate only’
grapes may increase a consumer's willingness to pay a
premium for a wine as a result of ‘perceived’ homegrown
quality and attendant quality control; a winery using grapes
from estate vineyards sourced in a particular region, e.g.,
Mitsuko's Vineyard in California's Napa Valley, commands a
price premium over wines sourcing grapes from other regions
in California.4
Choosing one or multiple distribution channels is another
strategic choice for a winery. Winery decisions to distribute
none, some or 100% of their production via DTC channels
may be due to any number of reasons, whether the winery is
averse to risk, e.g. following defensive routines and reacting
slowly to environmental changes; or has resource capabilities
to compete in the distributor market (Carter et al., 1994; Hofer
et al., 1991; Miles et al., 1993).
To summarize, one of the primary ﬁndings in the literature
is that SME wineries differentiate themselves in order to attain
and sustain proﬁtability. Two of the primary sources of
differentiation are the sourcing of grapes used to produce
wine and distribution channel. Although these are not the sole
sources of differentiation among wineries, they are two key
strategic processes by which wineries differentiate themselves.
Given the primacy of these two methodologies, we developed
a simple two-by-two model based only on these two attributes
to distinguish between the wineries in our data set.
This two-by-two model enables mapping proposed relation-
ships between two speciﬁc ﬁrm resources hypothesized to be a
source of competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001;
Fernandez, 2011). For this study, degree of sourcing choice
and degree of distribution choice classify SME wineries into
four quadrants of the model. (See Fig. 1.) Therefore, we
hypothesize the four quadrants will be deﬁned as follows:(footnote continued)
loosely deﬁned as having a brand name, its own management and winemaker,
but produces its wine at bonded hosted or shared facilities.
4Mitsuko's Vineyard is from Clos Pegase in Napa Valley, California.– Wineries that source less than half their grapes with estate
and less than half their production distributed through DTC
channels – Group 1.
– Wineries that source less than half their grapes with estate
and more than half of their production distributed through
DTC channels – Group 2;
– Wineries that source more than half their grapes with estate
and less than half of their production distributed through
DTC channels – Group 3; and
– Wineries that source more than half their grapes with estate
and more than half their production distributed through DTC
channels – Group 4;
Based on the assumption that SME ﬁrms employ differ-
entiation strategies in practice, we have developed the follow-
ing hypotheses.
H1. Differentiation strategies in a mature, traditional industry
positively impact long-term ﬁnancial performance in terms of
proﬁtability; therefore, wineries in Group 4 will be more
proﬁtable than ﬁrms in the other three groups.
H2. Differentiation strategies in a mature, traditional industry
positively impact long-term ﬁnancial performance, relating to
ﬁrm growth; therefore, wineries in Group 4 will grow more
quickly than ﬁrms in the other three groups.3. Methodology
3.1. Dataset
Whereas Ellinger et al. (2011) used Compustat to ascertain
the impact of a differentiation strategy on the long-term
ﬁnancial performance of large ﬁrms, prior studies on SMEs
and family ﬁrms typically had to resort to self-reported and
cross-sectional ﬁnancial performance data based on one
moment in time, rather than systematically gathered and
veriﬁed longitudinal data. We obtained data collected by
Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) from 120 of its winery clients
over ﬁve continuous years, 2006–2010. The rich dataset
provided by SVB included both traditional ﬁnancial data
(balance sheet, income statement, and ﬁnancial ratios) as well
as demographic data for each winery on grape supply chain,
business model, and distribution channel. We were given
access to the data under a strict conﬁdentiality agreement.
Since the number of wineries varied in each annual data set,
data sets were scrubbed so that only those wineries providing
ﬁnancial and operational data across all ﬁve years were
retained for the analyses. The data yielded usable and
consistent annual ﬁnancial and operational statistics for only
71 wineries; a number accepted, as it was felt that only
complete ﬁve-year time-series data would provide needed
validity and longitudinal robustness, as discussed by Leitner
and Güldenberg (2010). All wineries were from California,
Oregon, and Washington, enabling a ‘West Coast wine
business cluster’ for purposes of analysis (Porter, 1998).
Fig. 2. Data scatterplot of hypothesized two-by-two differentiation strategy
model.
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Shi and Yu (2013) found that proper sourcing strategy of a
ﬁrm can improve its ﬁnancial performance. Thus, independent
variables (IV) identiﬁed for this study are strategy choices such
as supply chain, business model, and distribution channel (Box
and Miller, 2011; Degravel, 2012; Edelman et al., 2005; Minai
and Lucky, 2011; Pertusa-Ortega et al., 2010; Verreynne and
Meyer, 2010); and are deﬁned as follows:
 Supply chain – sourcing percentages for estate-only,
purchased fruit, and bulk wine purchase, with the sum of
all three totaling 100%.
 Model of the winery – estate, négociant, and virtual.
 Distribution channel – percentage of product sold via DTC,
in-state wholesale, and out-of-state wholesale, with the sum
of all three totaling 100%.3.3. Performance measures (DV)
Dependent variables (DV) identiﬁed for this study are
growth in production and revenues (Brush and Vanderwerf,
1992); gross proﬁt margin (GPM) and return on assets (ROA)
(Qi et al., 2011; Rocchi and Stefani, 2001; Wagner et al.,
2012); and return on investment (ROI) and optimal capital
structure (Dyer et al., 2009; Viviani, 2008); and are deﬁned as
follows:
 Firm proﬁtability – GPM and ROA.
 Firm growth – Net Cased Goods Sales, Case Production,
and Case Sales.4. Findings
To analyze the data, SPSS Statistics, Version 21 was used.
First, a cluster analysis was performed to classify the sample
into the four quadrants of our hypothesized two-by-two model.
The strategy choices data (supply chain choice percentages,
model of the winery, and distribution channel choice percen-
tages) for 71 respondent wineries were entered into the cluster
analysis, and four signiﬁcant clusters emerged. Fig. 2 depicts a
scatterplot of the data clustered as hypothesized per the two-
by-two differentiation strategy model.
To test hypotheses, multivariate analysis of variance (MAN-
OVA) and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were used. Standard
and multivariate assumptions were tested and found adequate
to perform the appropriate analyses. Owing to the need for ﬁve
complete and continuous years of data, the sample size for this
study was small (n¼71); and while the recommended cell size
for multivariate analyses of 20 observations was not met, the
observed power for each multivariate analysis was 0.80 or
greater (Hair et al., 1998).
Table 1 presents means for cases produced, cases sold, as
well as sourcing and distribution channel percentages for the
71 ﬁrms in the analysis clustered within their groups.4.1. Firm proﬁtability
Following Qi et al. (2011) and Wagner et al. (2012),
MANOVA was used to assess the differences between the
group means of the proﬁtability dependent variables: Gross
Proﬁt Margin (GPM) and Return on Assets (ROA). Multi-
collinearity between the two dependent variables was not a
signiﬁcant issue with Pearson correlations at 0.445. Table 2
shows the cross tabulation of the four clusters and the size of
the corresponding respondent winery. Pearson Chi-Square tests
were not signiﬁcant at 0.501 indicating that winery size was
not signiﬁcant within any of the four clusters.
To test H1, GPM and ROA data were averaged across the
ﬁve years and entered as the dependent variables. Four
quadrants (groups), representing the degree of supply choice
and degree of distribution choice, were entered as the
independent variable. All four of the omnibus MANOVA test
statistics were signiﬁcant at alpha (α)¼0.01 cutoff with an
F-statistic¼4.426 (Roy's Largest Root), Sig.¼0.007 with an
observed power of 0.855 offering support for H1. While the
univariate test results for ROA were not signiﬁcant at α¼0.05
cutoff with an F-statistic¼1.179, Sig.¼0.325, the univariate
test results for GPM were signiﬁcant at α¼0.05 cutoff with an
F-statistic¼3.902, Sig.¼0.013. Fig. 3 shows the yearly GPM
means plots for years 2006–2010 for all four groups, and the 5-
year average GPM, where signiﬁcant differences were found
between Groups 1 and 4 (Sig.¼0.024) and between Groups
3 and 4 (Sig.¼0.085) from the Scheffe post hoc tests.
An examination of the raw average GPM data in Fig. 3
shows that the wineries in Group 4 were more proﬁtable over
time than the other three groups of wineries. The GPMs each
year, except for 2006, as well as the aggregated ﬁve year
average for Group 4 wineries were higher than the other three
groups of wineries.
While ROA was signiﬁcant in the omnibus MANOVA, it
was not signiﬁcant in the univariate test. To examine ROA
further, ANOVA tests were performed to determine whether or
not the differences each year among the four groups were
Table 1
Sample characteristics.
Gp 1 (N¼31) Gp 2 (N¼12) Gp 3 (N¼15) Gp 4 (N¼13)
Averaged 2006–2010 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Case sales 18,679 3646 10,138 3283 50,258 20,111 11,799 2773
Case production 22,112 3984 13,614 4155 54,655 21,250 14,398 3183
Sourcing channels (totaling 100%)
At estate 9.3 2.5 28.2 4.8 87.7 4.4 95.2 2.3
Purchased grapes 90.5 2.5 71.8 4.8 12.3 4.4 4.4 2.4
Bulk wine purchase 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.4
Distribution channels (totaling 100%)
Direct-to-consumer 18.6 2.5 67.3 6.6 21.1 3.1 68.4 6.2
In-state wholesale 20.3 4.0 11.2 3.6 9.8 3.3 13.4 3.2
Out-of-state wholesale 52.1 3.7 21.6 5.7 69.1 3.6 20.0 4.6
Table 2
Cross tabulation of winery size and four clusters (groups).
Winery size Groups Total
1 2 3 4
o4000 6 1 2 3 12
4000–o20,000 11 8 5 6 30
20,0004 11 3 8 3 25
(4 wineries omitted)
Total 28 12 15 12 67
Fig. 3. 2006–2010 GPM means plots by Group and 5-year Ave. GPM plots–
H1 post hoc tests.
Fig. 4. 2006–2010 ROA means plots by Group and 5-year Ave. ROA plots.
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the groups at α¼0.10 cutoff, but we chose to show the ROA
data to visually compare the proﬁtability of the four groups.
Fig. 4 shows the yearly ROA means plots for years 2006–2010
for all four groups, as well as the 5-year average ROA.
4.2. Firm growth
Firm growth is often associated with increases in sales revenues
over time (Brush and Vanderwerf, 1992). Compound annualgrowth rates (CAGR) for years 2006–2010 were computed for
Case Production, Case Sales, and Net Cased Goods Sales. We
again chose MANOVA to assess the differences between the
group means of the CAGR for years 2006–2010 for Case
Production, Case Sales, and Net Cased Goods Sales. Pearson
correlations between the three dependent variables were not
sufﬁciently high to warrant a multicollinearity issue (Hair et al.,
1998); they ranged between 0.526 and 0.831.
To test H2, the CAGR data for years 2006–2010 for Case
Production, Case Sales, and Net Cased Goods Sales were
entered as the dependent variables. Four quadrants (groups),
representing the degree of supply choice and degree of
distribution choice, were entered as the independent variable.
The MANOVA test statistic, Roy's Largest Root, was sig-
niﬁcant at alpha (α)¼0.01 cutoff with an F-statistic¼6.399,
Sig.¼0.001 with an observed power of 0.959. The univariate
test results are shown in Table 3, of which the CAGR for Net
Cased Goods Sales is signiﬁcant at α¼0.01 cutoff, and CAGR
for Case Sales is signiﬁcant at α¼0.05 cutoff. The means for
each of the four groups and the dependent variables are also
shown. While the statistical analysis was signiﬁcant offering
support for H2, we hypothesized that Group 4 would
Table 3
Firm growth univariate test results – H2.
CAGR for
2006–2010
F Sig. Gp
1 mean
(%)
Gp
2 mean
(%)
Gp
3 mean
(%)
Gp
4 mean
(%)
Net cased
goods sales
5.282 003a 3.01 14.76 2.02 11.99
Case
production
1.206 353 2.07 4.14 2.86 1.72
Case sales 3.138 032b 1.34 15.33 5.79 10.78
aSigniﬁcant at the 0.01 level
bSigniﬁcant at the 0.05 level
Fig. 5. CAGR for net cased goods sales case production, and case sales means
plots-H2 post hoc tests.
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support for H2.
Fig. 5 shows CAGR for Net Cased Goods Sales, Case
Production, and Case Sales means plots from the H2 post hoc
tests, which includes signiﬁcant differences in the CAGR for
Net Cased Goods Sales found between Groups 1 and 2
(Sig.¼0.025), and Groups 2 and 3 (Sig.¼0.035) in the
Scheffe post hoc tests. Signiﬁcant differences in CAGR for
Case Sales were found between Groups 1 and 2 (Sig.¼0.057)
in the Scheffe post hoc tests.
5. Discussion, implications, and future directions
Porter (1985) opined that uniqueness does not lead to
differentiation unless it is valuable to a buyer. “The ultimate
basis for differentiation is a ﬁrm and its product's role in the
buyer's value chain which determines buyer needs” (Porter,
1985: 34). SMEs can gain a competitive advantage over other
rivals either through differentiation or lowest cost strategies
(Barney, 1991; Hill and Jones, 2010). Actual SME winery
ﬁnancial data — never before available to researchers —
provided a means to test SME winery strategies on measures of
performance — using ﬁve continuous years' ﬁnancial data to
permit the evaluation of differences in the outcomes of prior
strategic decisions. In this study, SME wineries were statisti-
cally clustered according to opportunities for developing newproducts and markets and making internal innovations or
developing new processes that facilitate growth and success
(Kickul and Gundry, 2002). While the simple two-by-two
model proposed relationships between two speciﬁc ﬁrm
resources – degree of supply chain choice and degree of
distribution channel choice, all three choices for supply chain
and distribution channel, and the model of the winery were
entered into the Cluster Analysis. Interestingly, the Cluster
Analysis results found four distinct clusters that maximized the
differences among the cases. These four clusters as shown in
Fig. 2 can be seen to fall closely in line with the hypothesized
two-by-two model using two speciﬁc ﬁrm resources – degree
of estate grapes (supply chain choice) and degree of DTC
(distribution channel choice). Speciﬁcally, Group 1 wineries
source less than half their grapes with estate and less than half
their production distributed through DTC channels, and Group
2 wineries source less than half their grapes with estate and
more than half of their production distributed through DTC
channels. Group 3 wineries source more than half their grapes
with estate and less than half of their production distributed
through DTC channels, and Group 4 wineries source more
than half their grapes with estate and more than half their
production distributed through DTC channels.
There can be concerns that the size of winery might affect
results of a study, yet this was not the case with the data.
Pearson Chi-Square tests were insigniﬁcant, and therefore,
winery size for this data was not an issue.
5.1. Proﬁtability
The business model of the sample ﬁrm (estate or non-estate
winery) is a proxy of degree of quality; estate wineries are
perceived as higher status / quality than non-estate wineries, as
is the value of sourcing wine from grapes at the estate. Groups
3 and 4 sourced more than 50% of their grapes at the estate, while
Groups 1 and 2 sourced less than 50% of their grapes at the estate,
and purchased more than 50% of their grapes. These variable
differences can be seen in the sample characteristics in Table 1.
Wineries continue to make strategy choices in the distribu-
tion channel as a way to differentiate – whether to gain
customers, increase its wine club membership, or mitigate the
three-tier distribution. Groups 2 and 4 distributed more than
50% of their production via DTC, while Groups 1 and
3 distributed less than 50% of their production via DTC.
Speciﬁcally Group 1 distributed more than 50% of their
production via out-of-state wholesale with remaining even
distribution going to DTC and in-state wholesale; whereas
Group 3 distributed more than 50% of their production via out-
of-state wholesale with remaining larger distribution going to
DTC and remaining smaller distribution going to in-state
wholesale. Again, these variable differences can be seen in
the sample characteristics in Table 1.
Signiﬁcant differences are evident when the proﬁtability
variables, Gross Proﬁt Margin (GPM) and Return on Assets
(ROA), are evaluated together using the four quadrants
representing the degree of quality / status and degree of
differentiation as the independent variable. While the
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both proﬁtability variables, GPM differences are of singular
signiﬁcance: Those wineries in Group 4 (greater than 50%
estate grapes and greater than 50% DTC) outperform Group 1
(less than 50% estate grapes and less than 50% DTC) and
Group 3 (greater than 50% estate grapes and less than 50%
DTC). Of note, Group 2 (less than 50% estate grapes and
greater than 50% DTC) outperformed Groups 1 and 3, while
not signiﬁcant. It is of interest however, that wineries
distributing greater than 50% of their production via DTC
was a signiﬁcant characteristic of those higher performing
wineries.
Two questions arise from closer inspection of the data in
Figs. 3 and 4: (1) When comparing GPM and ROA for Group
4 and Group 1, why is the average GPM for Group 4 higher
each year, except for 2006, while the average ROA for Group
4 is actually lower each year, except for 2009? (2) Why was
not the ROA analysis statistically signiﬁcant while the GPM
analysis was signiﬁcant? We believe the answer to both of
these questions is a function of the equity component of the
ROA calculation, consistent with earlier ﬁndings for larger
ﬁrms by Wagner et al. (2012). The equity value used in the
calculations is the book value of equity in the balance sheets
provided to SVB by its client wineries. All SVB clients are
privately owned. Book values of the equity of those clients are
highly variable, and variations in how equity is valued result in
larger overall variance for the ROA than for GPM outcomes.
The larger variance in the ROA is the likely explanation for
uncharacteristically low ROA for wineries in Group 4 in 2010,
and for differences in the annual GPM and ROA data.
5.2. Growth
From inspection of the growth variables, Case Production,
Case Sales, and Net Cased Goods Sales (each compounded
annually through 2006–2010), MANOVA test results indicate
signiﬁcant differences among Net Cased Goods Sales and Case
Sales. While we hypothesized wineries in Group 4 would
outperform other wineries, they did not outperform Group
2 wineries. Group 2 wineries signiﬁcantly outperformed Group
1 and 3 wineries in growth of Net Cased Goods Sales. Group
2 wineries also outperformed Group 1 wineries in growth in
Case Sales. This is consistent with Edelman et al. (2005), who
used compound annual growth rates in Return on Sales as a
proxy for performance. Here again, we can see that Groups
2 and 4 distributing over 50% of their production DTC grew at
higher rates for all three indicators, Net Cased Goods Sales,
Case Sales, and Case Production, than the other two groups.
5.3. Limitations
Among the limitations of this study was the inability of SVB
to provide the research team with its proprietary ﬁnancial data
set for the ﬁve years (2001–2005) just prior to the period under
study (2006–2010), making it impossible to compare the
impacts, if any, of changes in strategy antecedent or subse-
quent to the 2005 Granholm v. Heald decision. Similarly, wewere unable to compare performance during what was a
prolonged growth period for premium wineries — in the years
from 2001–2006 — both before and after the onset of the
Great Recession in mid-2008. Firms that provided incomplete
ﬁnancial or operating data for each of the ﬁve years from
2006–2010, or that were no longer clients of the bank and
exited the data set were excluded from the sample, resulting in
a loss of 53 ﬁrms from the original set of 120. Including and
examining the data of most of those other 53 ﬁrms, perhaps by
comparing their performance in FY 2006 with their perfor-
mance in 2010, but omitting the years in between, is a
possibility for a future investigation. While we recognize that
there are other dimensions to winery performance (such as
environmental and or societal impacts) that could be used to
measure winery performance, to our knowledge, data on these
indicators are not available. Our research focus was on the
proﬁtability and growth ﬁgures that are available in the
data set.
5.4. Future directions
The recent prolonged economic downturn attenuated ﬁnancial
performance in the wine industry and most likely adversely
impacted the results for FY 2009 and FY 2010. Along these lines,
future researchers might consider other deﬁning characteristics to
further differentiate SMEs, e.g. during periods of relative prosper-
ity. Indeed, part and parcel of a future investigation would be for
researchers to compare the strategies of primarily equity-owned
ﬁrms to those in a bank's database, i.e. that presumably have
relied upon lines of credit or long-term debt ﬁnancing. Research-
ers might also investigate the impact of a ﬁrm age (years in
business), or number of employees (difﬁcult to determine as
many winery staff are seasonal due to the harvest cycle), data that
were not available for use in this investigation. Researchers could
also compare the ﬁnancial performance of similar-sized SMEs
across countries and markets to ascertain if differentiation strategy
choices consistently result in superior ﬁnancial performance.
Finally, as the wine industry comprises a range, from large
multi-national corporations to small family-owned and -operated
ﬁrms, each with its own particular product portfolio, degree of
vertical integration, and channel choices, future investigation
might compare the impacts of differentiation strategies on
performance, in general, and direct-to-consumer channel choices,
in particular, using ﬁrm size as a delimiting criterion. Firm size
(in this instance, case production unit volume) is likely to be an
explanatory variable for use of DTC channels: some industry
observers opine that it is easier to move 2000–3000 cases of wine
direct from a winery and through wine clubs than to sell 30,000–
100,000 cases via DTC channels.
5.5. Practical implications
SMEs with a well-deﬁned, proactive strategy are not only more
likely to identify opportunities for developing new products and
markets, but also willing to make internal innovations and
develop new processes that facilitate growth and success
(Kickul and Gundry, 2002; Chang et al., 2011). This investigation
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differentiation strategies most clearly impacts SME performance
over time, and conﬁrms a recent study by Banker et al. (2014),
i.e., ﬁrms with a differentiation strategy had continued higher
performance over those with a cost leadership strategy. By
holding industry and geography constant (using a cluster
approach) we attempted to minimize the environmental ‘noise’
that has distorted many prior multi-industry or multi-regional
studies.
Box and Miller (2011: 57) write: “Because [during our
investigation of small businesses] interviewers had to explain
generic strategy to business representatives, we infer strategy,
in general, and generic strategy in particular were not front
burner issues for them. This is troubling because a consistent
strategy has been demonstrated to correlate with performance
in a large number of empirical studies.” To assist SME
practitioners in translating the results of this investigation into
strategy for future resource allocations, we believe that it is
necessary to:
1. Ask your lender to share with you their analysis and
interpretations of client ﬁnancial data to assist you in
understanding industry best practices,
2. make an effort to increase your ﬁnancial literacy, e.g.
understanding what drives margins, returns on investment,
and compound annual growth rates (and how those are
calculated) to enable you to benchmark the impact of
strategic choices against rivals,
3. pursue quality differentiation strategies to sustain growth, and
4. pursue selective innovations in supply chain choices, both
backward for raw materials and forward for distribution and
sales, as those choices positively impact performance.
We hope that the additional insight gained from the
typology of differentiation strategies and the use of proprietary
ﬁnancial data will enable SME owners and managers and their
ﬁnancial advisors to more effectively direct scarce resources to
choosing the supply chain conﬁgurations and distribution
channel choices that not only tend to absorb the majority of
managerial attention, but also result in the greatest, most
consistent revenue growth and proﬁtability over time.Acknowledgments
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